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U.S. Dietary Supplement Regulation: Belief
Systems and Legal Rules

Michael H. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
The starting-point for current debate regarding regulation of dietary
supplements in the United States is the federal Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act (DSHEA),.1 enacted in 1994. One of the major
justifications the statute provides for its enactment is the need to "protect
the right of access of consumers to safe dietary supplements ... in order to
promote wellness." 2 This justification is amplified in the Report of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on DSHEA.

The

Committee specifically found that the Food and Drug Administration (the
FDA) "pursued a regulatory agenda which discourages... citizens seeking
to improve their health through dietary supplementation. In fact, the FDA
has had a long history of bias against dietary supplements... [and] pursued
a heavy-handed
enforcement agenda against dietary supplements for over
3
30 years."
In light of these findings and comments, DSHEA has had enormous
popular appeal, yet has generated controversy among regulatory
authorities, particularly the FDA. Since the statute's enactment, various
* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. M.B.A.,
Haas School
of Management, University of California, Berkeley. M.F.A., Iowa Writers' Workshop,
University of Iowa. B.A., Columbia University. Michael H. Cohen, Esq. specializes in
health care and regulatory affairs and is a Visiting Professor of Health Law on the East
Campus of Arizona State University. This article is part of a chapter to appear in slightly
different form in BEYOND COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON HEALTH CARE AND HUMAN EVOLUTION (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

forthcoming 2000). For more information see http://www.michaelhcohen.com.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 1, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
301 et seq. (1994)).
2. Id.§2.
3. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 14 (1994) (hereinafter DSHEA Report). Among other
activities, in between 1966 and 1973, the FDA issued proposed regulations to classify
vitamins as over-the-counter drugs if the product exceeded 150 percent of the
Recommended Daily Allowance. See id. at 15. In the 1970s, the FDA attempted to regulate
vitamins by claiming they were toxic. See id. The history is further summarized in the
DSHEA Report. Id. at 14-17.
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regulatory proposals have circulated to further restrict consumer access to
dietary supplements. Rather than give detailed analysis to one or more
such specific proposals, I will address broader and more pervasive
questions: Ideally, how should the government regulate dietary
supplements? In setting controls on the dietary supplement market, should
regulation tip toward restriction or freedom? How do underlying beliefs
about consumer health and intelligence shape regulatory values, policies
and rules? In what ways do the paradigmatic differences between
conventional medicine, and complementary and alternative medicine,
suggest how underlying belief systems ultimately influence the regulatory
stance and resulting legal rules?
I. KEY DSIEA PROVISIONS
The key provisions of DSHEA, for purposes of this discussion, are as
follows:
A. DEFINITION OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS
The statute defines "dietary supplements" as products which contain,
either individually or in combination, vitamins, minerals, herbs or other
botanicals, amino acids or other products for use to supplement the diet by
increasing total dietary intake.4 The dietary supplement must be available
for consumption as a tablet, capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap or liquid. If it
is not intended to be taken in such form, it must neither be represented as
conventional food nor may it be represented for use as the sole item of a
6
Dietary
meal or diet.5 All dietary supplements must be
7 so labeled.
supplements are not classified as "food additives."
B. REGULATORY STATUS OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS
DSHEA reaffirms that dietary supplements are "foods" and not
"drugs,"8 thus exempting dietary supplements from the requirement of new
drug approval under the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA). A
"drug" includes, among other things, "articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease."' )
C. STATUS OF "NEW" DIETARY INGREDIENTS

Dietary ingredients present in the food supply before passage of
DSHEA (October 15, 1994) are presumed safe. "New" dietary ingredients
are deemed adulterated unless: (1) the ingredient has been present in the
4. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1)(A)-(F) (1994).
5. See id. § 321(ff)(2)(A)-(B). The definition includes powders, bars and drinks. See
DSHEA Report, at 35.
6. See id. § 321(ff)(2)(C).
7. Id. § 321(s)(6).
8. Id. § 321(ft).
9. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B).
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food supply as an article used for food in a form in which the food has not
been chemically altered; or (2) the dietary ingredient has a history of use or
other evidence of safety establishing that the ingredient, when used under
the conditions recommended in the labeling, will be reasonably expected to
be safe, and such information regarding safety is submitted to the Secretary
of the Department of Health at least seventy-five days prior to the release
of the dietary supplement.10 The safety of a dietary supplement is to be
judged only under its labeled conditions of use or, in the absence of such
labeling, under the supplement's ordinary conditions of use."
D. "ADULTERATED" SUPPLEMENTS

The Secretary of Health and Human Services may employ emergency
authority to declare a supplement adulterated and immediately remove the
supplement from the market, if the supplement poses an imminent hazard
to public health or safety.' 2 The government, however, has the burden of
proving that the dietary supplement is adulterated.' 3 The FDA must notify
an alleged offender at least ten days prior to filing a formal complaint with
allowing the alleged offender to present
the United States Attorney,
14
evidence in defense.
E. "MISBRANDED" SUPPLEMENTS

The FDA may remove misbranded dietary supplements from the
market. Misbranding occurs when the manufacturer fails to list the name
of each dietary ingredient of the supplement and quantity of each such
ingredient.' 5 Misbranding also occurs if the dietary ingredient's nutritional
information, ifany, is not contained on the product label. 16 DSHEA also
provides for regulations prescribing good manufacturing practices for the
production of dietary supplements.' 7
F. USE OF LITERATURE IN CONNECTION WITH SALE
DSHEA authorizes the use of literature in connection with the sale of
dietary supplements by modifying the definition of "labeling."
Specifically, a publication used in conjunction with sale is not "labeling"
under the FDCA if the publication: (1) is not false or misleading, (2) does
not promote a particular manufacturer or brand of dietary supplement, (3)
presents a balanced view of the available scientific information, (4) if

10. Id. § 350b(1)-(2).
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A) (1994).
12. See id. § 342(f)(1)(C).
13. See id. § 342(f)(1). In contrast, manufacturers bear the burden of proving that food
additives, when added to food, are "generally recognized as safe" ("GRAS"). Id. at § 348.
14. See id. § 342(f)(2).
15. See id. § 343(s).
16. See id. § 343(q)(1)(5)(F).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(g)(2) (1994).
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displayed in a store also selling dietary supplements, is displayed separate
and apart from the dietary supplements, and (5) does not have appended to
it any information by sticker or any other method. 18 Thus, dietary
supplement retailers may sell books, reprints of articles, abstracts,
bibliographies and other publications as part of their business under the
above conditions. Again, the government bears the
burden of proof to
9
establish that a book or article is false or misleading.'

G.

STATEMENTS OF NUTRITIONAL VALUE

DSHEA allows manufacturers to include a statement of the
supplement's nutritional value, provided that: (1) the statement claims a
benefit related to a classic nutrient deficiency disease and discloses the
prevalence of such disease in the United States, describes the role of a
nutrient of dietary ingredient intended to affect the structure and function in
humans, characterizes the documented mechanism by which a nutrient or
dietary ingredient acts to maintain such structure or function or describes
general well-being from consumption of a nutrient or dietary ingredient; (2)
the manufacturer of the dietary supplement has substantiation that such
statement is truthful and not misleading; and (3) the statement contains a
disclaimer that the statement has not been evaluated by the FDA. ' °
The statement may not claim that the product will diagnose, mitigate,
treat, cure or prevent a specific disease or class of diseases.2 1 Without FDA
approval, for example, a manufacturer may not make the following health
claim for a calcium supplement: "Calcium will prevent osteoporosis."
However, the manufacturer, without FDA approval, may make a
"structure/function" claim such as, "calcium helps build healthy bones. 22
The disclaimer must include a statement that the product is not intended to
diagnose, treat, cure or prevent any disease.2 3

H.

HEALTH CLAIMS

A "health claim" is a "claim made on the label or in labeling of... a
dietary supplement that expressly or by implication... characterizes the
18. Id. § 343-2(a)(l)-(5).
19. See id. § 343-2(b)-(c).
20. See id. § 343(r)(6)(A)-(C).
21. See id. § 343(r). A product is subject to regulation as a "drug" if intended to "affect
the structure or any function of the body of man," unless it is a food. Id. § 321(g)(1)(C)
(emphasis added). The intended use of the product, as shown by representations made for it
in promotional materials, determines whether that product and its ingredients are subject to
regulation as a food or drug. See id. If a vitamin or herbal product, for example, is
represented for use as a "dietary supplement," it is regulated as food; if it is represented to
cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease, it is a drug. DSHEA Report, supra note 3, at 20.
22. DSHEA Report, supra note 3, at 20. The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
standard for FDA approval of health claims, "significant scientific agreement," remains in
effect for dietary supplements during a two-year period of study by the Dietary Supplement
Commission established under DSHEA. See id. at 23-24.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) (1994).
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relationship of any substance to a disease or health-related condition. 24
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (the NLEA) provided
that health claims for foods must be based on well-designed studies and
"significant scientific agreement" among qualified scientists that the
claimed link between a nutrient and disease is valid, taking into account the
"totality of publicly available scientific evidence."5 Thereafter, the
Dietary Supplement Act2 6 imposed a one-year moratorium on
implementation of the NLEA with respect to dietary supplements.
DSHEA did not define the standard to be applied to health claims for
dietary supplements. 27 Instead, it created an independent Commission on
Dietary Supplement Labels (the Commission) to provide recommendations
on the issue.28 The mandate of the Commission was to study and make
recommendations concerning the regulation of label claims and statements
for dietary supplements. In so doing, the Commission was to "evaluate
how best to provide truthful, scientifically valid, and not misleading
information to consumers so that such consumers may make informed and
appropriate health care choices for themselves and their families., 29 The
FDA subsequently promulgated a rule providing that the "significant
scientific agreement" standard would be applied when evaluating the
validity of health claims on dietary supplements.3 °

24. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1) (1998).
25. Pub. L. No. 101-535, §3(a)(B)(i), 104 Stat. 2353, 2359 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (1994)).
26. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered
sections starting at § 21 U.S.C. 321 (1994)).
27. The FDA recently proposed broadening its definition of disease from a definition
referring to "damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the body." to "any deviation
from, impairment of, or interruption of the normal structure or function... of the body."
Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the
Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23624, 23625-26 (proposed
April 29, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101). The FDA was severely criticized for
this proposed change. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Daniel Burton to Michael A. Friedman
(August 27, 1998) (suggesting that new definition would include conditions such as
pregnancy, menopause and aging and make any claim for alleviating symptoms these states
a health claim ("disease claim")).
28. The Commission recommended that the significant scientific agreement standard also
be applied to dietary supplements. COMM'N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS 31 (1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT]; see also Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements: The
Boundaries of Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REv. 663, 680 (1997). The
Commission further recommended greater FDA use of outside expert reviewers. See
COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 64.

29. 21 U.S.C. § 343 note.
30. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.14(c), 101.70. To date, only two health claims on dietary
supplements have been authorized: calcium for osteoporosis and folate for neural tube
defects. See id. §§ 101.72(c)(2)(ii)(C), 101.79(c)(2)(ii)(B). The FDA has approved several
health claims on food-for example, fruits and vegetables for cancer, and soluble fiber for
coronary heart disease. See id. §§ 101.78, 101.81.
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II. HAS DSIEA GONE TOO FAR?
A.

EXTREME MEDICAL PATERNALISM AND RADICAL CONSUMER

AUTONOMY
In addressing whether DSHEA has gone too far in loosening regulatory
controls on the dietary supplements market, the legislation can be viewed
as either a political event or a philosophical shift. Politically, DSHEA
marked a victory for advocates of increased access to vitamins, minerals,
herbs, amino acids and other dietary supplements, and a defeat for those
who believed in strict regulatory controls on dietary supplements.
Philosophically, DSHEA represented a compromise between two poles:
extreme medical paternalism on the one hand, and radical patient autonomy
on the other.
Extreme medical paternalism holds that the majoritarian medical
consensus, based on existing medical orthodoxy or the views of a
government agency such as the FDA, should dictate consumer access to
Paternalism involves interference with
products and substances.3 1
autonomous choices. Medical paternalism refers to the notion of the
physician as a benevolent parent making decisions for dependent, ignorant
children.32 By extreme medical paternalism, I refer to the notion that
patients' choices should be overridden despite their making voluntary and
autonomous choices that are based on information available to them from a
variety of sources, including but not limited to information printed on the
labels of goods. At the other extreme, radical consumer autonomy means
that patients should have unlimited access to goods whether or not their
decisions are informed or even volitional.33
Traditionally, health care regulation in general, and food and drug law
in particular, has tilted the balance toward extreme medical paternalism. I
have argued elsewhere 34 that this regulatory stance emerged from
biomedical control of licensing, educational and reimbursement
mechanisms, beginning in the late nineteenth-century, which created a
biomedical monopoly and suppressed or excluded competitors in the
healing arts under the guise of patient protection. 35 In food and drug law,
the FDCA provides that no new drug may be introduced into interstate
commerce until the manufacturer has proven, to the FDA's satisfaction,

31. See Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm
of Holistic Healing, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79, 137 (1995).
32. See id. (citing TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES. F. CHILDRESS,
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126, 274 (1974)).

PRINCIPLES OF

33. The decision to take a dietary supplement would be "involuntary" if, for example, the
patient was somehow addicted to the particular supplement.
34. See Cohen, supra note 31.
35. See MICHAEL H.

COHEN, COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: LEGAL

BOuNDARIES AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 15-23 (1998).
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that the drug is "safe and effective" for its intended use. 36 Today it is
almost unthinkable that the law would change to allow manufacturers to
introduce drugs into interstate commerce without proving effectiveness as
well as safety by the current standards.
The policy is justified from a paternalistic perspective of patient
protection. Yet, safety and effectiveness are judged by the FDA; the focus
is on agency approval rather than consumer access. Thus, even if the
patient wants to use the drug, understands that it has not been proven safe
and effective to the FDA's satisfaction, and makes a knowing, intelligent
and voluntary choice to assume all known and disclosed risks of the
product (as well as those that cannot be disclosed because they are
unknown), the patient still cannot have access to the drug.
Paternalism softens in limited cases, such as that of terminally ill
patients who have no other medically proven choices. Therefore, in recent
years, the policy has been softened in certain situations-for example,
expedited approval and expanded access to potentially promising new
drugs for life-threatening diseases.37 Still, some patients may not fit the
required parameters for such expedited approval, and their receipt of the
drug remains contingent on FDA procedures.
For some patients, this is not only insufficient, but even dangerous.
For example, patients of Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski, a Polish emigree who
has been treating brain tumors with a non-FDA-approved treatment known
as "antineoplastons," recently testified in congressional hearings that the
FDA had blocked access to treatments patients deemed life-saving. 38 One
patient testified that her son, Dustin, was 2-1/2 years'old when he was
diagnosed with a brain tumor. The oncologists gave him a few months to
live and offered radiation treatment, which would leave him "a
vegetable., 39 Dr. Burzkinski's treatments, while derided by some members
of the scientific community, were, in the eyes of the child's mother,
successful. She testified: "Dustin... is a happy, healthy four-year-old
who has outlived his prognosis-[t]here is no [FDA-approved] treatment
that would have kept him alive with such good quality of life.''4° This
perspective provides a concrete, human example of the effect of defining
patient protection from a paternalistic vantage.
Another example comes from litigation in the late 1970's, during
which patients sought to establish a constitutional right to freedom of
access to medical treatments, whether or not such treatments had been

36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1994).
37. See id. at 75-76.
38. Cancer Patient Access to Unapproved Treatments, 1996: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Commerce House of
Representatives, 104th Cong. 3-6 (1996).
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. at 27.
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FDA-approved. In United States v. Rutherford, the United States Supreme
41
Court rejected efforts by terminally ill cancer patients to obtain laetrile.
The Court concluded that Congress reasonably could have intended to
protect terminal patients from drugs such as laetrile that had not been
proven safe and effective, and that it was not the Court's function to
overturn a "longstanding administrative policy [by the FDA] that comports
with the plain language, history, and prophylactic purpose" of the FDCA.42
On remand, the Tenth Circuit held that a patient's decision whether to
be treated is a constitutionally protected right, but that the patient's
"selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within the
area of governmental interest in protecting public health," and not
encompassed by the constitutional right to privacy. 43 Thus, Rutherford
rejected the claim patients made, based on a constitutional right to privacy,
to greater autonomous decisionmaking. Instead, the Court rested its
opinion on the medical paternalism inherent in the FDCA and its grant of
authority to the FDA. 44
DSHEA represented a marked departure from historical legal strictures
on patient access to nontraditional treatments and remedies. Reasonable
minds have differed, and will continue to differ, on whether this departure
constituted an evolutionary leap in federal health care regulation, or a
reckless unlocking of a Pandora's box. At the very least, DSHEA raises
several unresolved regulatory problems.
B. KEY PROBLEMS RAISED BY DSHEA
Major areas of difficulty raised by DSHEA include:
1) Safety of Dietary Supplements Generally
The statutory presumption that dietary supplements in the food supply
prior to October 15, 1994, are safe troubles some, as the manufacturer is
not required to substantiate safety, even if it later increases the dosage or
adds a new statement of nutritional support.45

41. 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979).
42. Id. at 554.
43. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 937 (1980).
44. Although the Southern District of Texas recognized a constitutional right to obtain
acupuncture in Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1057 (S.D. Tex. 1980). the holding
has by and large been rejected by subsequent courts. See, e.g., New York State
Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1988). But see Suenram
v. Society of the Valley Hospital, in which the New Jersey Superior Court held that a
terminally ill cancer patient, having tried chemotherapy, had a fundamental right to choose
laetrile as a last resort. 383 A.2d 143, 148 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1977). According to the
court, "Where a person is terminally ill... and unresponsive to other treatments, the public
harm is considerably reduced." Id. at 146.
45. See Gilhooley, supra note 28, at 702.
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Regulation of Potent Supplements Posing Risks of Harm

Because of the potential risk to consumers, the question has arisen as to
whether highly potent supplements should be governed by stricter
regulation, such as new drug approval procedures, rather than the easier
access provided by DSHEA.
3)

Distinguishing (Permissible) Nutritional Support Claims from
(Impermissible, Unapproved) Health Claims

Since passage of DSHEA, significant debate has arisen as to whether
specific statements made by manufacturers constitute the kind of claims

prohibited without FDA approval (for example, claims impermissibly
linking the dietary supplement to the diagnosis, mitigation, cure, or
treatment of a disease), or whether they are statements of nutritional value
permitted under DSHEA (for example, descriptions of the role of a nutrient
or dietary ingredient intended to affect structure and function in human
beings).
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish structure/function claims from
health claims. Examples of claims that are difficult to distinguish include
the claims that gingko biloba "improves memory and concentration;" that
saw palmetto can "maintain prostate health and well-being;" or that
echinacea "supports healthy immune function. '46 The various analytical
models proposed for making meaningful distinctions 47 may be so much
'hair-splitting' as to be a distinction without a difference.

In addition, even if no formal claims are made linking a specific
supplement to a particular disease, patients and health care professionals
regularly are turning to dietary supplements as instruments of healing

46. Dietary Supplement Statements of NutritionalSupport, The Tan Sheet 11-15 (Jan. 15,
1996), cited in Gilhooley, supra note 28, at 685-86. Gilhooley notes that while the FDA
receives notification of such statements pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6), prior FDA
approval for such statements is not required. See Gilhooley, supra note 28, at 724.
47. For example, the suggestion has been made that the test should be "claim-specific,"
and relate to whether a consumer would be able to understand how the supplement is to be
used to obtain effects normally associated with the use of foods. Gilhooley, supra note 28,
at 690. An alternative proposal is that claims "should not refer to uses that require
professional supervision and a prescription." Id. at 692.
The FDA recently released final regulations defining the types of statements that can
be made concerning the effect of a dietary supplement on the structure or function of the
body, and establishing criteria for determining when a statement about a dietary supplement
is a claim to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat or prevent disease, thus requiring FDA approval.
See Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the
Product on the Structure of Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1000 (2000) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101). Among other things, the regulations retain the definition of
"disease or health-related condition" in 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(5) which was part of the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, and provide that common conditons associated with
natural states or processes that do not cause significant or permanent harm (such as hot
flashes, premenstrual syndrome, and mild memory problems associated with aging) will not
be treated as diseases under this provision. Id.
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specifically targeted toward resolving particular conditions. Since passage
of DSHEA, the increasing role of dietary supplements in health promotion
and protection has led to a blurring of the conceptual lines between foods
and drugs. Hippocrates noted: "Let your medicine be your food, and your
food be your medicine." Consumers take dietary supplements and view
nutrition in the broadest sense as medicinal, eroding the notion that only
pharmaceuticals and surgery constitute medicine.
4)

Inappropriate Claims Through the Publication Exemption

The publication exemption allows consumers to receive promotional
statements regarding dietary supplements which could not independently
be made by manufacturers for their products. The concern, therefore, is
that consumers will remain unprotected from claims made with relatively
few restrictions in publications marketed as part of dietary supplements
sales.
The four concerns can be reduced to two: (1) safety of dietary
supplements (generally and especially in the case of extremely potent
supplements) and (2) regulation of claims on dietary supplements
(generally and through the publication exemption).
III. FRAMING THE DEBATE
A. THE EFFECT OF BELIEF SYSTEMS ON LEGAL RULES
It is useful to frame the debate in terms of regulatory proposal, policy,
values and belief system. Starting from belief system, each level generates
the succeeding one, as shown in Chart 1.

Chart 1
Generation of Regulatory Proposal from Core Belief System
4. One's core belief system generates -- 3. Operative values, which generate -- 2. policy choices,
which generate - 1. the regulatory proposal and arguments for such a proposal.

1) Regulatory Proposal
This level of the debate asks what legal rule is the most appropriate.
For example, should dietary supplements continue to be classified as
"foods?" Provided no impermissible health claims are made, should they
dietary supplements be considered "drugs?" Or should some intermediate
category be created in which access is more carefully controlled by federal
officials?
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Policy

The second level asks what overall stance should legislation or
regulation adopt toward complementary and alternative medicine generally,
and dietary supplements specifically. What attitude should govern rulemaking? How should lawmakers, FDA officials, and others regard these
products and the inclusion of dietary supplements in health care? Should
the posture be favorable or unfavorable? Are supplements generally to be
regarded as helpful or dangerous? As integral to a health care regime or as
deviant?
3)

Values

The third level asks who or what the rules and policies are attempting
to protect. Is it the individual, the wealth of an industry or the power of a
government institution? What is foremost: consumer autonomy, medical
authority, or regulatory control? What are the ultimate values guiding any
balancing of these interests?
4) Belief System
The fourth level addresses what we ultimately believe about such large
topics as truth, human existence, the nature and purpose of the body. Do
we ultimately believe that science has all the answers? Or that there is a
role for intuition-for personal revelation-in our health care choices,
irrespective of whether that intuitive choice is validated by existing
scientific methodologies (for example, the decision to consume certain
minerals)? Do we feel that the body is inert, mechanical and insentient or
that it is alive with conscious, intelligent energy, a responsive repository of
personal wisdom, to which we can attune in moments of misalignment?
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The link between rules, policies and values is summarized in Chart 2.
The generator of values, policies and legal rules is one's personal belief
system.
Chart 3 describes the different belief systems generating
assumptions in conventional medicine, and complementary and alternative
medicine. 48 Chart 4 suggests ways belief systems ultimately influence the
side of the debate one takes in dietary supplements regulation. 49
Chart 2
Values Policies and Legal Rules

Proposed Rule

Policy

Strong Controls

Weak Controls

(agency position)

(Industry position)

Physician recommendation

Complete consumer access

required for potent

unless FDA proxes the

supplements.

product is dangerous.

Protect consumers (who are

Protect autonomous choices

gullible).

of consumers (N ho are
informed).

Values

Prevent ignorant choices based

Protect intelligent decisions

on inadequate or faulty

based on sufficient

evidence, or stupidity.

disclosures.

Protect regulatory authority.

Protect industry. Prevent

Prevent public deception.

bureaucratic encroachment
on individual liberty.

48. See Chart 3 infra page 15.
49. See Chart 4 infra page 17.
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CoNVENTIONA/COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE

The "battle lines" between the two positions are drawn because of
conflicting belief systems. Essentially, there is a conflict between the
starting premises and worldviews of conventional medicine, and of
50
complementary and alternative medicine.

Chart 3
Mechanistic versus Holistic Healing Models

(Mechanistic)

Complementary and
Alternative (Holistic)

Focus on

Cure/the body.

Care/the Self/grace.

Disease caused by

Germs/genes/

Imbalance of energies/stress/

Biochemical, pharmacalogical

weakening of life force.

Conventional

phenomena.
Healing comes from

Drugs/surgery/

Within/internal self-

Technology/the doctor/

healing/resolution of

"placebo effect."

emotional and spritual
dimensions as well as physical
manifestation of illness.

Altered states of

Delusional; nonscientific;

Central to healing; potential

consciousness are

abnormal or meaningless.

sources of information
regarding disease and
transformation; part of journey
to wellness.

Conventional medicine generally adopts a mechanistic and
reductionistic view of the human organism and disease. This view derives
from Newtonian physics and Cartesian dualism, two paradigms which
dominated intellectual thought during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Briefly, Newtonian physics views the universe as a
gigantic machine whose whirring parts function according to
predetermined laws. Cartesian dualism splits body and mind, regarding the
two as separate and independent. Conventional medicine thus views the
50. See generally CoHEN, supra note 35, at 1-8.
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body as a series of parts (much like a clock), amenable to pharmacological
interventions whose effect can be precisely measured, and which operate in
isolation from emotional, social, psychological and other factors.
Thus, generally speaking, in conventional medicine, the focus of the
disease is on curing the body. Disease is viewed as caused by germs, genes
and is a biochemically-and pharmacologically-controlled phenomena.
Healing is viewed as coming from drugs, surgery and technological
interventions, as well as from the knowing doctor and/or what is called the
"placebo effect." Altered states of consciousness-such as moment of
personal insight into underlying emotional and spiritual issues behind the
physical symptoms or experiences of visits from departed relatives (in the
case of dying patients, for example)-are viewed as abnormal,
nonscientific or meaningless at best and delusional at worst.
Complementary and alternative therapies generally adopt a holistic,
biopsychosocial view of health and disease. Such therapies interpret health
and disease as products of dynamically inter-relating physical, emotional,
mental and even spiritual factors.5 ' Some of these therapies even assert
that, ultimately, every disease is caused by a distortion of the mental,
emotional or spiritual body, which translates into problems on the physical
level. For example, traditional oriental medicine views disease as the
product of an imbalance in chi, vital force or universal life energy. What
conventional medicine calls "kidney disease," traditional oriental medicine
might view in terms of an imbalance of water in the system.
In these therapies, the ultimate focus transcends relief of symptoms and
eradication of physical illness, and moves into the notion of self-care,
reverence for one's self and grace. Disease is seen as having origins in
stress, an imbalance of energies or a weakening of the life force. Healing
comes from within (and some would say, from without-from a Supreme
Being). It involves a resolution of emotional and spiritual dimensions of
illness as well as of physical issues. Altered states of consciousness are
frequently seen as central to healing, or as potential sources of information
regarding the disease and one's healing journey.52
C. EXAMPLE: FDA STANDARD FOR HEALTH CLAIMS ON DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS

To ground these large paradigmatic distinctions in food and drug
policy, take the example of health claims. The FDA standard for health
claims on dietary supplements has been "significant scientific agreement."
From the standpoint of the need to protect patients and prevent consumer
51. See id.
52. See generally
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fraud, it is defensible to require that health claims have a certain level of
generally accepted scientific validity. On the other hand, the underlying
belief system is that scientific authority-as filtered through the FDAshould be the arbiter of what is healthy or dangerous for the human body.
This assumption is so ingrained in the regulatory system that it hardly
makes sense to question it.
Yet, one could adopt another position: the belief that the individual,
operating on nonmisleading information from a variety of sources, should
determine for himself or herself what is healthy, safe or dangerous. The
belief accords greater respect to personal authority for decisionmaking
regarding one's own health care choices. It asserts that the individual, and
not prevailing scientific authority, ultimately determines what is 'healthy'
or 'dangerous.'

Chart 4
Influence of Belief System
BELIEF SYSTEM

Strong Regulatory Controls

Weak Regulatory Controls

Who Determines What is

Scientific authority, as filtered

The individual, operating on

"Healthy"/Dangerous

through FDA.

truthful, nonmisleading
information from a variety of
sources.

What authority is ultimate in

Scientific principles.

health care choices

Personal intuition; personal
revelation; personal choice.

How should consumer

Irrational and hence unworthy

Worthy of respect irrespective

choices be understood

of credence or authority.

of FDA or majoritarian
medical views.

Nature of the Body

Mechanistic and subject to

Holographic, alive, and filled

reductionistic interpretation.

with conscious, intelligent
energy; "body wisdom."

One could quibble with the above analysis and argue that it begs the
question of what information is misleading. That is, health claims are
misleading when they are not backed by "significant scientific agreement."
This kind of reasoning, however, is circular; it assumes that the only way
consumers will have valid information is when a certain level of scientific
authority states that such information is valid. Again, the underlying belief
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is that consumers lack the ability to discern what is healthy and
nondangerous for themselves.
Many consumers walk into a health food store and select certain
vitamins, minerals or other supplements merely because they feel this is
good for them. They have some intuitive sense that some substance on that
particular day will have a medicinal effect. Perhaps their grandmother or a
friend recommended zinc or echinacea to help fight off a cold: or perhaps
they had a dream, and some spirit spoke to them and told them to get the
zinc; or maybe it was simply a 'gut feeling.' We can call this phenomenon
personal intuition, or we can call it personal revelation, or body wisdom, or
the revelation of the body; or we can simply call it, personal choice.
Whatever name we use, we are lending authenticity to a nonscientific and
mysterious process.
In invoking the irrational, the emotional, the intuitive here-and
suggesting that it has validity, that it deserves respect-I am on dangerous
ground; I am subverting accepted notions of medical orthodoxy. But this
is, in fact, what complementary and alternative medicine does. It
challenges accepted structures of thinking. Complementary and alternative
therapies-such as acupuncture and traditional oriental medicine,
Ayurvedic medicine, folk medicine, biofield therapeutics, or even some
forms of chiropractic and massage therapy-signal a potential revolution in
thinking about disease and health. These therapies propose explanatory
models that have not and, in many cases, cannot be measured in Western
science.
An example would be the notion of chi in traditional oriental medicine.
There may be no analogues to chi in the science we know, unless we turn
to certain theories of physics that accept the proposition that intent and
consciousness can play a role in shaping reality and healing the human
body. 3 The reference to supposedly scientific phenomena (such as dietary
needs) in terms that sound mystical is particularly offensive to the medical
model, yet emblematic of many modalities within complementary and
alternative medicine.

D. D.C. CIRcUIT's RESPONSE TO FDA POSMON
Recently, in Pearson v. Shalala,5 4 manufacturers and advocates
challenged the FDA standard of "significant scientific agreement" for
health claims on dietary supplements. Specifically, appellants (plaintiffs)
challenged the FDA's rejection of four health claims: (1) consumption of
antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancer; (2)
consumption of fiber may reduce the risk of colorectal cancer; (3)
consumption of omega-fatty-acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart

53. See generallyMICHAEL TALBOT, THE HOLOGRAPHIC UNIVERSE (1992).
54. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc denied, 172 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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disease; and (4) .8 mg of folic acid in a dietary supplement is more
effective in reducing the risk of neural tube defects than a lower amount of
foods in common form.
Appellants claimed, among other things, that the standard of
"significant scientific agreement" violated the First Amendment by failing
to employ "a less draconian method"-the use of disclaimers-to serve the
government's interest in consumer protection. The government's response
to this challenge was that, even with disclaimers, consumers still may be
confused as to which claims were preliminary and which were supported
by significant scientific agreement.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the government's argument, characterizing it
as stating "that health claims lacking 'significant scientific agreement' are
inherently misleading because they have such an awesome impact on
consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to exercise any
judgment at the point of sale. 56 The court added: "It would be as if the
consumers were asked to buy something while hypnotized, and therefore
they are bound to be misled."57 The court then characterized this
perspective as "almost frivolous," and analogized it to a case in which the
Supreme Court rejected the "paternalistic assumption that the recipients...58
are 'no more discriminating than the audience for children's television."'
The court thus called the FDA's position paternalistic and chastised the
FDA for treating dietary supplement consumers like an "audience for
children's television. 59 The court further characterized the underlying
assumption that consumer choices should be understood as irrational and
hence unworthy of credence or authority, as if consumers were
"hypnotized, and therefore.., bound to be misled" when they purchase
It criticized the notion that it is "virtually
dietary supplements.
impossible" for consumers "to exercise any judgment" when it comes to
buying dietary supplements. 6 ' In this sense, the court gave greater respect
and authority to consumers' own determination of what is healthy or
dangerous, with the individual operating on nonmisleading information
from a variety of sources, including the label.
The court characterized as "more substantial" the government's
argument that health claims on dietary supplements could be potentially
misleading because the consumer would have difficulty in independently
verifying these claims. 62 However, the court suggested that such a concern
55. See id. at 651.
56. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 655 (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill.,
496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990)).
59. Id.
60. Pearson,164 F.3d at 655.
61. Id. (citing Peel, 496 U.S. at 105).
62. Id.
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might be addressed by disclaimers informing consumers that the evidence
for the claims made is "inconclusive." 63 As to the government's concern
that consumers might assume the FDA had approved the claims, the court
64
suggested a disclaimer stating, "The FDA does not approve this claim."
Further, the FDA could require a prominent disclaimer setting forth adverse
effects of the dietary supplement. 65 The court concluded that the
government had not met its burden in showing that suppression, as
opposed to disclosure through disclaimers, was justified as a sufficiently
tailored restriction on speech to achieve the government interest in
consumer protection. 66 The Court thus endorsed the notion of increasing
the amount of information available to the consumer on the label, as
opposed to limiting the kind of statement the manufacturer could make.
The Court's decision does not adopt or endorse a holistic view of
wellness and illness, suggest that the body has its own intelligence or
consciousness, or in any way delve into some of the larger propositions
advanced above. It does, however, rebuff a regulatory perspective that robs
the individual of freedom to make decisions that deeply affect one's own
self care. Though based on First Amendment grounds, the freedom the
opinion articulates is broader than freedom of expression through a labeling
on a dietary supplement container. The opinion points to a freedom of
choice in health care and revives the notion that even though the FDA has
decided that consumers will be inherently misled and confused, the
consumers are legally empowered to make certain health care decisions,
regarding purchasing consumption of dietary supplements.
CONCLUSION
As noted, continuing debate surrounds the question of safety of dietary
supplements, and the regulation of claims on dietary supplements. The
second question, determining the proper boundaries for approval of health
claims, remains unanswered and complex. 67 The recommendation of use of
disclaimers by manufacturers making less than fully substantiated claims
does, however, suggest greater acceptance of consumer intelligence and
autonomy in making health care choices surrounding dietary supplements.
Such a movement toward greater autonomy suggests a growing belief that,
with some exceptions, consumers should have the freedom to make their
own choices regarding dietary supplements, and that safety issues can be
63. Id. at 658.
64. Id. at 659.
65. See id.
66. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. and Prof I
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)) (emphasis added).
67. At least in Pearsonv. Shalala, the D.C. Circuit held invalid the FDA's interpretation
of its general regulation and rejection of the four proposed health claims, and remanded the
case to the district court with instructions that the FDA "must explain what it means by
significant scientific agreement or, at minimum, what it does not mean." Id. at 661.
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addressed by a regulatory system that encourages information, rather than
restricting access.
Ideally, one would hope that the shift toward a more open and
accessible market for medicinal substances, would expand rather than
contract; that the dawn of a new millenium would bring a greater
awareness, on the part of pertinent legal and medical communities, of the
role of personal responsibility in individual health care choices; that the
notion of health care freedom would create greater respect than fears about
consumer self-abuse and misuse; and that the body politic would be seen as
a holographic collection of autonomous, responsible beings, intelligently
engaged in the individual pursuit of well-being, rather than as a ravenous,
gullible and unpredictable horde prey to mesmerizing, pill-pushers.
Framing the debate in these terms helps open the levels of structure, the
complexes of thought and emotion, that generate the assumptions
underlying the various regulatory proposals and the policy arguments
behind each. By creatively examining our core beliefs and the values that
underlie regulatory positions, the debate may be clarified, the doors of
perception may be opened, and, ideally, the laws that govern self-care may
more faithfully track the core of human aspirations toward health.

